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Abstract 
The traditional real options valuation methodology, when enhanced and 
properly formulated around a proposed or existing software investment employing 
the spiral development approach, provides a framework for guiding software 
acquisition decision-making by highlighting the strategic importance of managerial 
flexibility in managing risk and balancing a customer’s requirements within cost and 
schedule constraints. This article discusses and describes how an integrated risk 
management framework based on real options theory could be used as an effective 
risk management tool to address the issue of requirements uncertainty as it relates 
to software acquisition and, therefore, guide the software acquisition decision-
making process. 
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I. Introduction 
In the US Department of Defense (DoD), technology acquisitions in the form 
of software-intensive weapons systems serve as the cornerstone of the 
transformation strategy currently adopted by the US Military in its efforts to 
modernize its fleet of weapons systems for future conflicts. However, the benefits of 
these force “enablers” continue to be plagued by massive cost and schedule 
overruns. The resulting impact has often led to a reduced scope of desired 

























aircraft 26.7 14.2 
Future 
Combat 
Systems $92 billion 18 System
$163.7 
billion 14 systems 54.4 22.3 




billion 181 aircraft 188.7 72.1 
Table 1. Program Management Failures of  
Top Three Major Weapons Systems 1 
The software component plays a critical role in the success of each of these 
acquisition programs. As it stands today, software is the major expense in the 
acquisition of software-intensive systems with its role as a technology platform, 
rising from providing a mere 8% of weapons systems functionality in 1960 to over 
80% functionality in 2000 (Fields, 2008) (Figure 1). 
                                            
1 Numbers were compiled from various GAO reports and were current as of 2007. 
 - 2 - 

















F -4 A - 7 F - 111 F -15 F -16 B - 2 F/A 22
1960 1964 1970 1975 1982 1990 2000



















Figure 1: Software Growth in Weapons Systems  
(Fields, 2008) 
Considering the immense presence and ever-increasing role software plays in 
weapons systems, software is, and should be, treated as a capital investment, and it 
is necessary to develop an approach emphasizing a strategic investment 
methodology in its acquisition. This approach would emphasize the linking of 
strategic program management decisions to current and future unknown software 
requirements within the stipulated parameters of cost, risk, schedule, and 
functionality. Such a strategic program management approach is needed to 
overcome the limitations of the spiral development process currently utilized in the 
Evolutionary Acquisition (EA) approach as adopted in the DoD 5000 series 
acquisition directives––it assumes the end-state requirements are known at the 
inception of the development process (Sylvester & Ferrara, 2003), albeit a 
misrepresentation of reality in the acquisition of DoD software-intensive weapons 
systems. The spiral development process is a risk-driven development approach 
consisting of four main phases: determining objectives/alternatives, risk analysis, 
development, and planning. The phases are iteratively followed one after the other, 
building progressively on the first iteration until a complete software product is built. 
Of the four phases, the risk analysis phase is the most important because a project's 
success is highly dependent on the ability to identify and resolve risk. Risks are 
continuously discovered, and high-priority risks drive the development process. 
However, addressing risk at the development phase is a somewhat costly approach.  
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II. Methods 
Risk management should be a considered much earlier in the software 
engineering process—at the acquisition level, during the investment decision-making 
activities prior to the commitment to acquire and/or develop a software system. The 
appropriate risk mitigation/reduction strategies or options should be crafted much 
earlier in the software investment/acquisition process, which would lead to the real 
options approach proposed in this article. 
A. Real Options Valuation  
Real options valuation originated from research performed to price financial 
option contracts in the field of financial derivatives. The underlying premise of its 
suitability and applicability to software engineering is based on the recognition that 
strategic flexibility in software acquisitions decisions can be valued as a portfolio of 
options or choices in real “assets,” much akin to options on financial securities which 
have real economic value under uncertainty (Dixit & Pindyck, 1995). In contrast to 
financial options, real options valuation centers on real or non-financial assets and is 
valuable because it enables the option holder (i.e., software program manager) to 
take advantage of potential upside benefits while controlling and hedging risks. 
When extended to a real “asset” such as software, real options could be used as a 
decision-making tool in a dynamic and uncertain environment. Real options are 
implicit or explicit capabilities created for real assets that provide the software 
manager with time-deferred and flexible choices (options) regarding future risks or 
changes of software and could explicitly address the issue of software investment 
choices for future capabilities. Through these capabilities, the software manager 
may choose to adjust, reduce, increase, or abandon the investment in the future, 
thereby stabilizing returns from the assets. 
A necessary and key tenet of the real options approach is a requirement for 
the presence of uncertainties—an inherent characteristic of software acquisitions 
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decision-making. Software acquisitions encapsulate the activities related to software 
procurement, development, implementation, and subsequent maintenance. The 
uncertainties that surround these activities are compounded by increasingly complex 
requirements demanded by the warfighter. They present themselves in various 
forms ranging from changing or incomplete requirements, insufficient knowledge of 
the problem domain, decisions related to the future growth, technology maturation 
and evolution of the software.  
To tackle the issue, a formal and distinct uncertainty elicitation phase is 
proposed as part of the software investment decision-making process (Figure 2) to 
obtain information on the relevant uncertainties from a strategic point of view. While 
this phase would not include members of a typical requirements team, they would 
work in tandem with the requirements team to identify and document uncertainties 
revealed from an independent point of view. Implementing an explicit uncertainty 
elicitation phase would facilitate the identification of uncertainties early in the 
acquisition process so that the necessary steps could be taken to either refine the 
requirements to address the uncertainties or identify strategic options to mitigate the 
risks posed by the uncertainties.  
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Figure 2: Uncertainty Elicitation Model 
During the uncertainty elicitation step in the model, uncertainties are captured 
from two perspectives (the managerial and technical perspective) using what we call 
the “2 T” approach as illustrated in Figure 3. Managerial uncertainties of people, 
time, functionality, budget, and resources contribute to both estimation and schedule 
uncertainties that are considered pragmatic uncertainties.2 Technical uncertainties of 
incomplete requirements, ambitious, ambiguous, changing or unstable requirements 
contribute to software specification uncertainties, which lead to software design and 
implementation, software validation and software evolution uncertainties—all of 
which can be categorized as exhibiting both Heisenberg-type3 and Gödel-like4 
uncertainties. 
                                            
2 Pragmatic uncertainties are problems in performing the development activities. 
3 Heisenberg-type uncertainties occur as the system is being developed and grows during use. They 
exhibit themselves in the form of changing requirements either due to unsatisfactory behavior post 
implementation.  
4 Gödel-like uncertainties occur when the properties of a program cannot be known from the 
representation because the software systems and their specifications are abstract models of the real 
world. 
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If the uncertainty cannot be resolved, strategic real options could be 
developed to address the risks posed by the uncertainty, thereby providing 
management the flexibility to address the risks posed by the uncertainties when they 
become revealed at a later date during the acquisition effort. 
 
Figure 3: Expanded View of Uncertainty Elicitation Model 
B. The Real Options Valuation Framework 
To develop appropriate options that would hedge against the risks from 
uncertainties surrounding a software acquisition effort, we develop a generalized 
Real Options framework (Figure 4) in line with the five preconditions outlined in 
(Mun, 2006). This proposed framework consists of the following six phases each of 
which explicitly addresses and establishes compliance with the preconditions.  
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1. Assessment Phase 
2. Risk Determination Phase 
3. Options Analysis Phase 
4. Options Valuation Phase 
5. Investment Valuation Phase 
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Figure 4: Real Options Framework 
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III. Sample Application of the Framework 
This section provides a sample application of the framework using a software 
component, the Future Combat Systems Network (FCSN), of the US Army Future 
Combat Systems program (Congressional Budget Office, 2006). 
A. Phase I: Needs Assessment 
(a) Business Case: The needs assessment phase culminates in the 
establishment of a business case. The business case would also include a financial 
model in compliance with the first precondition of the real options approach that calls 
for the existence of a basic financial model used to evaluate the costs and benefits 
of the underlying software asset being considered for acquisition. The traditional 
discounted cash flow model with a net present value (NPV) is employed to satisfy 
this requirement and NPV is computed in terms of five high-level determinants 








−∑ - I 
I is the (initial) development cost of the FCSN 
t is the (initial) development time or time to deploy the FCSN. 
C is the asset value of the FCSN over time t 
M is the operation cost of the FCSN over time t 
r is the rate at which all future cash flows are to be discounted (the discount 
rate). 
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A NPV of $6.4 trillion was computed for the FCSN using estimated values 
based on key assumptions in (Olagbemiro, 2008).5  
(b) Uncertainty Identification: Uncertainty identification is the next crucial step 
performed during the needs assessment phase. In this step, the uncertainty 
elicitation model is used as a mechanism to identify uncertainties. When applied to 
the FCSN, it was determined that requirements uncertainty fostered by technology 
maturation issues (GAO, 2008a) plagued the FCSN program and introduced several 
other corresponding uncertainties. Thus, the following uncertainties were determined 
retroactively predictable.  
Technical Uncertainties 
 Requirements uncertainties 
 Integration uncertainties 
 Performance uncertainties 
Managerial Uncertainties 
 Estimation uncertainties (size and cost of the software) 
 Scheduling uncertainties 
B. Phase II: Risk Determination 
The risk determination phase consists of two steps: (a) uncertainty 
quantification and (b) volatility determination. 
(a) Uncertainty Quantification: Risk implies uncertainty, and consequently, 
uncertainty must be duly quantified as a risk factor with the goal being to assign an 
appropriate numerical value to the uncertainty. This is accomplished by gathering 
evidence using historical data from previous acquisition efforts that faced similar 
                                            
5 NPV of $6.4 trillion is computed based on: (1) Value of the FCSN program = future value less 
operating costs (i.e. sum of (C – M)) = $10 trillion, (2) Initial development cost I = $163.7 billion, (3)  r 
= 3%, and (4) Time t to develop the FCSN = 13 years. 
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risks. In the absence of historical data, the Delphi method is utilized. The objective of 
the evidence gathering activity is to equate the software engineering uncertainties of 
the current investment effort to a quantifiable property (risk factor) based on 
historical evidence in order to gauge the magnitude/impact of the risk on the 
underlying asset. In our study, while a suitable proxy for the FCSN program was not 
readily available, data obtained from the Joint Strike Fighter program was fitted and 
utilized as a source of historical information for comparative purposes. The risk of 
requirements changes in the FCSN program was estimated to be 12% (as oppose to 
0.28% for the JSF program, which is 1/5 the size of the FCSN program) using the 
Capers Jones formula shown below (Kulk & Verhoef, 2008).6  
 
(b) Volatility Determination: Volatility is used to quantify the effect of the risk in 
the form of variations in the returns associated with the investment. Volatility 
accuracy is a key factor in real options valuation because it drives the value of a real 
option and is positively related to value. While high volatility signifies high risk and 
implies a higher discount rate, and lower value in traditional NPV valuation, a high 
volatility in real options analysis is linked to high option value because greater 
volatility creates a wider range of possible future values of the opportunity as the 
option would only be exercised if the value of the opportunity exceeds the exercise 
price (Hevert, 2008). A Monte Carlo simulation of the risk model (Figure 5) was run 
using the Risk Simulator software, taking into account interdependencies between 
the risk variables to emulate all potential combinations and permutations of 
outcomes. The analysis indicated that requirements volatility introduced an overall 
volatility of 0.0866% in the FCSN program. The volatility of 0.0866% resulted in a 
reduction in the NPV of the FCSN program from $6.4 trillion to $6.1 trillion. This 
                                            
6 The requirements volatility of 12% was computed based on start and ending SLOC for the FCSN 
program. SLOC is used for demonstration purposes only. A more suitable metric such as function 
points is recommended. 
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reduction in NPV is a result of the potential of increased costs in light of the risks 
facing the FCSN program, which ultimately reduces the value of the investment 
effort from a financial point of view. 
 
Figure 5: Modeling Software Engineering Uncertainties7 
To improve the accuracy of the volatility estimates, we chose to refine the 
volatility using the Dempster Shaffer Theory of Evidence (DST) (Arnborg, Kungliga & 
Hogskolan, 2006) which aims to provide increased belief, partial belief, ignorance or 
conflict with our initial estimates. This is accomplished by establishing “belief 
functions” that reflect the “degrees of belief” between our NPV estimates in light of 
the risks posed by requirements uncertainty and the FCSN cost estimates provided 
by two independent sources: the Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) and the 
Institute of Defense Analysis (IDA) (Congressional Budget Office, 2006). The 
independent belief functions based on the CAIG and IDA that inferred basic 
probability assignments associated with each of the FCSN risk factors (i.e., 
requirements, integration, estimation risk, etc.) were combined using an orthogonal 
matrix to determine the most probable beliefs for the set of risk factors. When the 
combined functions reflected “belief” in our estimates, our estimates were 
                                            
7 Both the Managerial and Technical uncertainties are fed into a risk model and epistemic and 
aleotoric uncertainties characterized from the inputs. 
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considered to be valid and were left untouched, and in situations when the combined 
belief functions reflected conflict with our estimates, our estimates were revised to 
reflect the estimates computed using the DST approach. We then ran the Monte 
Carlo simulation of the model with the revised risk estimates again. Based on the 
risk of requirements uncertainty8 presented in the FCSN, a resulting “refined” 
volatility of 0.0947% was obtained. The derived volatility, which reflects an increase 
from the initial volatility estimate of 0.0866%, results in a further reduction of NPV of 
the FCSN program from $6.1 trillion to $5.7 trillion. Details of the computation can be 
found in (Olagbemiro ,2008). 
C. Phase III: Options Analysis  
This phase involves the identification of options. Once the volatility of the 
software investment effort has been determined, possible options could be identified 
to manage the risks associated with the software investment effort (Figure 6). In this 





                                            
8 While there are several risk factor based on the technical and managerial uncertainties, we focus on 
requirements risk due to its overwhelming impact on the FCSN. 




























Option to scale up through cost effective sequential investments as 
knowledge of the product increases 
Delay Investment until more information or skill is acquired.
e.g. Introduction of new requirements 
A flexibility option to switch products, processes  given a shift in underlying 
price of input and output demands  
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Shrink or shut down a project part way through if new information 
changes the expected payoffs. e.g. Introduction of new requirements
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is obtained. e.g. switch from custom development to COTS
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potential in the business opportunity is meant to address
Description and Example
 
Figure 6: Sample Options to Address Software Investments (Mun, 2006) 
To take advantage of the options identified, the issue of software design is 
revisited. From a real options perspective, the decomposition of the software into 
components, modules or subsystems serves to introduce flexibility that the software 
executive or program manager could exploit and benefit from. As software design is 
a key activity aimed at conceiving how a software solution would solve a particular 
problem, factoring modular decomposition into the design would support the 
following two propositions: (Damodaran, 2007) 
 Some projects that look attractive on a full investment basis may 
become even more attractive if the project is partitioned or 
decomposed into components because we are able to reduce 
downside risk at the lowest possible level.  
 Some projects that are unattractive on a full investment basis 
may be value creating if the firm can invest in stages. 
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A successful modular decomposition would introduce flexibility into the 
acquisition process by recasting the software effort as a series of options to start, 
stop, expand or defer the development of a module or subsystem when 
requirements uncertainty is encountered. Given that the FCS software effort has 
been decomposed into the following six components: Combat Identification, Battle 
Command and Mission Execution, Network Management System, Small Unmanned 
Ground Vehicle, Training Common Component, and Systems of Systems Common 
Operating Environment (GAO, 2008b), the FCS software development effort could 
be recast as a series of Deferment/Learning Options and Investment/Growth 
Options during which the option to Start, Stop, Scale Down staff, and Reallocate 
Resources, and Resume Development when uncertainty is resolved or Defer 
Development in the face of requirements uncertainty is utilized. This whole strategy 
is based on the correct partitioning/decomposition of the FCS Network into the 
appropriate systems or subsystems.  
To highlight this strategy, we present a scenario. 
Scenario 1: At least one out of the six software components is not facing 
requirements uncertainty  
In this scenario, we assume that of the six component systems, one is not 
facing uncertainty. We proceed to develop different options to address this scenario. 
We examine two possible options 1) Compound Option 2) Deferment Option  
Compound Option 
In the event that at least one of the software components is not facing 
requirements uncertainty, with all the others facing requirements uncertainty, an 
option could be developed to scale down the resources/staff allocated to the 
software components facing requirements uncertainty. The staff could then be 
switched to work on the software component that is not facing requirements 
uncertainty, while the uncertainties in the other components are addressed using our 
uncertainty elicitation model. (Note: The assumption with this approach is that the 
software component development effort the staff engineers are being reallocated to 
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work on is not already behind schedule and does not violate Brooks Law9). If the 
development effort that the staff are being assigned to work on is late (behind 
schedule), the number of staff, experience level and role that the added staff would 
play in the software development effort must be taken into consideration.  We 
therefore frame the real options in this case as an Option to Contract and Scale 
Down from an uncertain system, Option to Switch resources to another system, 
Options to Expand and Scale Up staff assigned to the development of a system not 
facing uncertainty (shown as Strategy A in Figure 7). This is essentially a compound 
option, which has an “exercise” contingent on the execution of the preceding option. 
Deferment Option 
In the event that five of the six software components are facing requirements 
uncertainty, an option could be developed to stop and defer all development to 
include the development of the software component not facing requirements 
uncertainty for a specified period until uncertainty is resolved (shown as Strategy B 
in Figure 7). This is an Option to Wait and Defer. 
                                            
9 Brooks law states that adding people to a late project makes it later. 
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Figure 7: FCS Strategy Tree depicting Strategy A and B for given Scenario 
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D. Phase IV: Options Valuation  
Valuation plays a central part in any acquisition analysis. Options are usually 
valued based on the likelihood of the execution of the options. There are several 
methods for computing and valuing real options, such as employing the use of 
closed-form models, partial differential equations, lattices, and so forth. For our 
study, we utilize the binomial approach and apply risk-neutral probabilities as this 
method elicits great appeal due to its simplicity, ease of use and the ability to solve 
all forms of customized real-life options.  
We utilize the Real Options Super Lattice Solver (SLS) 3.0 software 
developed by Real Options Valuation, Inc. for the task. The basic inputs are 
presented in Table 2.  
Symbol Real Option on Software 
Acquisitions Project 
Description 
S Value of underlying Asset: 
(Asset Price) 
Current Value of expected cash flows 
(Expected benefits realized from 
investing in the software effort (NPV)) 
K Exercise Price / Strike Price Price at which the created option 
would be realized (Investment Cost, 
of investing in options, which is an 
estimation of the likely costs of 
accommodating changes) 
T Time-to-expiration  The useful life of the option (Time 
until the opportunity disappears/ 
maturity date of the option contract) 
r Risk-free Interest Rate  Risk free interest rate relative to 
budget and schedule (Interest rate on 
US Treasury bonds) 
cv Volatility  Uncertainty of the project value and 
fluctuations in the value of the 
requirements over a specified period 
of time (Volatility in requirements, cost 
estimation and schedule estimation 
based on  DST of Evidence) 
Table 2. Real Options SLS Inputs 
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Strategy A 
The Real Options SLS software was populated based on the following 
underlying values:   
1. Development/Implementation cost of FCSN is $163.7 billion 
2. Value of underlying asset is $6.4 trillion 
3. The risk-free rate is 3.0% 
4. Volatility of the project is 0.0947 
5. Duration of software development is 13 years 
6. Lattice steps was set to 300 
 
Figure 8: Screen Shot of our Model in the Real Options SLS software 
The model was executed and the lattice of the underlying asset (FCSN) 
(Figure 9), as well as the Option Valuation lattice for  Strategy A (Figure 10) was 
created. The terminal values in our lattices (apex of lattice) are the computed values 
that occur at maturity, while the intermediate values in the lattices are the 
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computations that occur at all periods leading to maturity. All values are computed 
using backward induction. 
 
Figure 9: Lattice of Underlying Asset (FCS Network) 
 
Figure 10: Phase 1 Option Valuation Lattice 
The value of the underlying asset was computed as $6.4 trillion (Figure 9). 
The option analysis that represents the value of the option under Strategy A returned 
a value of $6.27 trillion (Figure 10). The option valuation lattice of each phase under 
strategy A was created and values computed using backward induction working 
backwards from Phase 3 to Phase 1 to arrive at the results depicted in Figure 10.  
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Strategy B 
In Strategy B, which calls for a “defer and wait approach,” an assumption is 
made that the duration for deferment option would be three years. We set up our 
model (Figure 11) using the same assumptions used in strategy A, but set the 
duration of the Deferment Option to three years. 
 
Figure 11: Real Options Super Lattice Solver Deferment Model 
The model is executed and similar to strategy A, the value of the underlying 
asset was computed as $6.4 trillion (Figure 12). In contrast, the option analysis 
returned a value of $6.25 trillion (Figure 13). 
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Figure 12: Lattice of Underlying Asset (FCS Network) 
 
Figure 13: Options Valuation Lattice under Deferment 
E. Phase V: Investment Valuation 
Given the option value of $6.27 trillion under strategy A, the intrinsic value of 
the compound option is determined to be $6.27 trillion – $5.7 trillion = $570 billion. 
Under strategy B, the intrinsic value of the deferment option is determined to be 
$6.25 trillion – $5.7 trillion = $550 billion. This implies that under both strategies A 
and B, the software executive should be willing to pay no more than (and hopefully 
mush less than) the option value of $570 billion and $550 billion, respectively, in 
addition to the initial investment cost of $163.7 billion to increase the chances of 
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receiving the improved projected NPV of $6.27 trillion for strategy A and $6.25 trillion 
for strategy B for the FCSN, as opposed to the current $5.7 trillion, in light of the 
risks caused by the uncertainties in five of the six software components. This 
premium would also include the administrative costs associated with exercising an 
option from an integrated logistics support point of view (i.e., costs associated with 
contractual agreements, costs associated with software development retooling, and 
costs associated with infrastructure setup of the infrastructure). 
In analyzing both strategies, strategy A is more attractive than strategy B. 
Instead of waiting three years at an additional cost of up to $550 billion (after which 
uncertainty would hopefully have been resolved) and then proceeding to spend 
$163.7 billion to develop all six software components, the staged phase approach in 
strategy A calls for spending up to $570 billion for the option up front in addition to 
some of the $163.7 billion for the Systems of Systems Common Operating 
Environment component, then investing more over time as the requirements are 
firmed up for the other five components. Therefore, under these conditions, Strategy 
A, which employs the compound sequential options, is the optimal approach. 
F. Phase VI: Execution 
The execution phase deals with the last precondition of real options valuation 
theory that asserts that decision-makers must be smart enough to execute the real 
options when it is optimal to do so. The options premium has two main components: 
intrinsic value and time value—both of which contribute to the valuation of the 
underlying software investment. For example, if the contract for the FCSN includes 
an option for Strategy A, then the software executive must be willing to exercise the 
compound sequential option when he or she observes that five of the six software 
components are at risk due to uncertainties. 
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III. Conclusion 
The current risk management strategy of reducing risk by employing the spiral 
development process is not sufficient because it assumes the end-state of 
requirements are known and takes a reactive approach in dealing with potential 
risks. Our proposed approach addresses the risks associated with software-related 
capital investments by taking a proactive approach towards risk management by 
emphasizing planning for and paying for risk up front. This is not to say that risk 
management strategies are not being adopted today; rather, we assert that a failure 
of management to take a strategic approach towards risk management occurs. The 
status quo emphasizes the employment of what is deemed to be a “tactical” 
approach in the form of the spiral development process, which results in the 
elimination/reduction of much-needed functionality from the scope of the software 
investment effort, usually when the acquisition effort is already in the development 
phase. Therefore, the proposed methodology in this report would help address some 
of the limitations of the spiral development process by serving as a mechanism 
through which the much-desired and needed planning associated with the spiral 
development process is provided. 
Uncertainties associated with software-related capital investments lead to 
unnecessary and sometimes preventable risks. As the DoD often sets optimistic 
requirements for weapons programs that require new and unproven technologies, 
the application of the real options valuation methodology would be beneficial as it 
would enable the DoD to incorporate the appropriate strategic options into the 
acquisition contracts. The options would serve as a contract between the software 
executive and the contractor––in the case of a government acquisition––to buy or 
sell a specific capability known as the options on the underlying project. The real 
options valuation approach is able to overcome the limitations of traditional valuation 
techniques by utilizing the best features of traditional approaches and extending 
their capabilities under the auspices of managerial flexibility. Barring the use of an 
explicit uncertainty elicitation phase as proposed in our research and the 
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development of options to hedge against the risk—ultimately executing the options 
as they appear—we believe the current acquisition process would continue to be 
plagued by the risks of cost and schedule overruns.  
The cost reduction strategy of reducing testing resource currently proposed 
by theDoD on the Joint Strike Fighter program, while risky in itself, still does not 
address the root causes of cost-related increases as identified in (GAO, 2008c), 
further underscoring the importance of a preemptive and strategic approach of 
identifying uncertainties early in a acquisition effort and paying for risk upfront. By 
employing our proposed approach, the DoD would optimize the value of their 
strategic investment decisions by evaluating several decision paths under certain 
conditions, which would lead to the optimal investment strategy.  
As part of the future work in connection with this research, we would like to 
formalize and create an automated software acquisition decision-making tool 
explicitly aimed at managing the risks associated with software-related capital 
investments using our Real Options approach. Specifically, we would like to gather 
historical information on previously completed software acquisition programs 
depicting the number of requirements planned at the onset of the acquisition effort 
and the number of requirements delivered at the end of the software acquisition 
effort, as well as the associated cost and schedule information for each acquisition 
program. We would use all the data to create a repository of historical programs that 
would serve as a basis of comparison with current/future acquisition programs to 
provide some insight into the issue of requirements volatility and its associated 
impact on cost and schedule overruns. By gathering historical information into a 
centralized repository, we hope to alleviate the assumptions we made in our study 
due to data gathering problems we encountered. We would incorporate the DST 
volatility refinement technique into our software tool and link our automated software 
acquisition decision-making tool to the repository containing historical data of 
previously completed software acquisition programs to provide a one “stop-shop” 
modeling toolkit to better facilitate the acquisition decision-making process. 
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